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NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE. By Lloyd L. Weinreb. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 320. $25. 
In the preface to Natural Law and Justice, Lloyd L. Weinreb1 • 
poses two questions: "What is the dispute between natural law and 
legal positivism?" and "What does the idea of justice add to the ideas 
of liberty and equality fully considered?" (p. vii). Ultimately, Weinreb 
attempts to answer these questions by demonstrating the relationship 
between them - th~oretically, a worthwhile exegetical technique. But 
the promise of a simultaneous and mutual explication of the two ques-
tions disappears into two separate quasi-historical analyses of theories 
of natural law and justice. Weinreb never elucidates the purpose of 
asking the two questions together in the first place. 
Weinreb hopes to show that each of the two questions rests on 
conceptual antinomies endemic to their subject matter and parallel to 
one another. The controversy between natural law and legal positiv-
ism arises from the inevitable clash between freedom and causation; 
when justice confronts liberty and equality two further antinomies re-
sult: the contest between desert and entitlement precludes a satisfac-
tory account of individual justice, and the tension between liberty and 
equality precludes such an account of social justice. In all of these 
antinomies, argues Weinreb, each part requires the other if either is to 
be understood - but a full comprehension of either half defeats the 
possibility of a rich notion of the other. For instance, any concept of 
entitlement depends on one of desert, but the full development of 
either concept displaces the other entirely. Weinreb devotes most of 
Natural Law and Justice to explicating this situation for each antin-
omy. Unfortunately, such tensions and even the parallels between 
them are standard fare in political philosophy.2 Weinreb fails to capi-
talize on the novel aspect of the two main questions he considers: the 
implications that each question has for the other. 
In part 1 of Natural Law and Justice, Weinreb attempts to reestab-
lish natural law as a viable legal theory. Historically, natural law the-
1. Lloyd L. Weinreb is Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Professor Weinreb's areas of 
specialization include criminal law, criminal procedure, and jurisprudence. He is also the author 
of DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1977) and CRIMINAL 
LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1987). 
2. In fact, many works address Weinreb's concerns, although from a variety of perspectives. 
For a sampling, see generally I. BERLIN, FOUR EssA YS ON LIBERTY (1969) (a seminal discussion 
of apparently incompatible conceptions of freedom); Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Lib· 
erty. in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 175 (A. Ryan ed. 1979) (a rebuttal of Berlin's preferred version 
of freedom); M. SCHLICK, PROBLEMS OF ETHICS, ch. VII (1939) (denying that the question of 
free will presents a serious philosophical difficulty); Campbell, Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem, 
in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 173 (H. Morris ed. 1961) (reasserting the problematic nature 
of free will). See also R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975). 
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orists sought to discover or to justify human sovereign law by 
reference to an a priori legal order posited by God and evidenced by 
nature. With the post-Enlightenment collapse of religious world-
views, such theories seemed implausible. Thus came the advent of 
legal positivism. Positivism ultimately validates human law self-refer-
entially;3 Weinreb maintains that this circularity fails to ensure the 
morality of law (p. 99). Instead, he urges a modern natural law theory 
that would reconnect law and morality by regarding as law only that 
which fits within a preexisting normative order (pp. 101-26). 
To develop this argument, Weinreb attempts to provide the reader 
with an understanding of natural law, and its beef with positivism, by 
tracing the conceptual development of natural law from ancient 
Greece to contemporary natural law theory. This whirlwind sweeps 
the reader through ancient Rome (discussing by name obscure Roman 
lawyers), medieval England (including such esoteric figures as John 
Duns Scotus and William of Ockham), and the Enlightenment ( devot-
ing subsections to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau). Although Weinreb 
highlights the aspects of natural law he perceives as continuous 
throughout the tour, the sheer number of stops does not allow a reader 
unfamiliar with the terrain a chance to formulate an overall view of 
the subject. Because Weinreb claims that his emphasis is not historical 
(p. 8), he should have reduced his attention to particular historical 
figures, and instead presented his own understanding of natural law, 
supplemented ·by references to the ideas he learned from his historical 
scholarship. In this way, the reader could proceed to the book's sec-
ond half with the first digested, ready to grasp the parallels crucial to 
Weinreb's method. 
In part 2 of the book, Weinreb discusses his second question and 
turns to justice as the cornerstone of the normative order he seeks. 
Weinreb tries to find a framework to accommodate both liberty and 
equality. This framework would, in turn, support his brand of natural 
law. To explore his second question, Weinreb shifts the focus of his 
technique from historical coverage to analysis of contemporary Amer-
ican political philosophers, particularly John Rawls, Robert Nozick, 
Alasdair Macintyre, and Michael Sandel. By diminishing the number 
of philosophers surveyed, Weinreb alleviates some of the rapid-fire ef-
fect found in the historical section. Still, the tension of attempting to 
make his own case via the works of others produces another difficulty 
reminiscent of those in the first part. Weinreb needs to prove his claim 
that justice contains an ineradicable antimony between desert and enti-
tlement on the individual level, and liberty and equality on the social 
level. Thus he critiques the leading liberal and communitarian ac-
3. For example: A particular piece of legislation is legally binding if and only if it is enacted 
constitutionally; and the constitution is legal because it was ratified according to proper proce-
dure ..• and so forth. 
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counts of justice, hoping to show both the presence of the antimony 
and the respective theorists' inevitable failure to resolve it. In these 
critiques, however, Weinreb seems more to be capitalizing on others' 
works to identify the concerns underlying his own project, than to be 
discovering tensions truly implicit in the works he appraises. 
Weinreb's treatment of Rawls illustrates this tendency.4 Weinreb 
argues that Rawls's theory of justice reduces justice exclusively to enti-
tlement; by eliminating desert from justice, claims Weinreb, "Rawls's 
theory diminishes the person - the area of personhood - by exclud-
ing personal characteristics that are ordinarily regarded as constitu-
tive" (p. 238). In other words, the "autonomy that remains [to the 
Rawlsian person] is an abstraction that attaches to a 'noumenal' self 
unrelated to the incidents of our actual lives" (p. 223). These claims 
depend upon a disputable reading of Rawls, particularly in light of 
Rawls's recent writings.5 Regardless of Rawls's latest work, however, 
Weinreb's claims seem to disregard elements of Rawls's initial theory 
of justice such as the thin theory of the good6 and the idea of social 
union, 7 which support Rawls's claim that "moral personality is char-
acterized by two capacities: one for a conception of the good, the 
other for a sense of justice."8 Rawlsian theory does not preclude con-
sideration of the experiences and attachments of our actual lives. In 
fact, these experiences constitute half of the foundation for the Rawl-
sian framework. Rawls's plan for justice must be constructed by 
selves with moral personality, and moral personality requires a con-
ception of the good. In the end, this conception stems from the over-
lapping experiences of actual people. The capacity for a conception of 
the good depends upon just those characteristics Weinreb claims 
Rawls's theory fails to accommodate. Rather than consider all of 
4. This review addresses only Weinreb's analysis of Rawls, although his treatments of 
Nozick, Macintyre, and Sandel suffer from similar flaws. 
5. See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987); 
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & Pue. AFF. 223 (1985); Rawls, 
Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 159 (A. Sen & B. Williams 
eds. 1982); Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. (1980); Rawls, The Basic 
Structure as Subject, in VALUES AND MORALS 47 (A. Goldman & J. Kim eds. 1978). 
6. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 399-416 (1971). The possibility ofa "thin" theory 
of the good gets Rawls's entire theory off the ground. He proposes and defends a "morally 
neutral" understanding of the good, whereby people with little specific knowledge of themselves 
or others can still evaluate the goodness of various entities based on their common knowledge of 
the world. Rawls offers as an example the functional appraisal of a watch: if one knows what a 
watch is, one can formulate a basic idea of the qualities of a good watch. The thin theory of the 
good depends precisely on our actual experiences. Id. at 401. 
7. Id. at 520-29. With the idea of a social union, Rawls acknowledges the importance of the 
good of community within a pluralistic theory of justice. Arguing that "human sociability" is 
essential to meaningful lives, Rawls awards a high priority to association. His rejection of com-
munity as the basis for a theory of justice does not imply that the actual people covered by the 
theory are "noumenal selves" forever alienated from one another. 
8. Id. at 561. 
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Rawls's theory, Weinreb merely isolates those aspects that generate 
support for his antinomies. 
Not only is Weinreb's discussion of Rawls objectionable; his criti-
cism of Rawls exposes a deeper problem in his own book. W einreb's 
fundamental criticism of Rawls has serious implications for Rawls's 
theory of personal identity (pp. 237-38). Yet Weinreb himself declares 
that although the "problems of personal identity and the minimum 
criteria of personhood are complex and notoriously difficult ... it does 
not seem necessary to embark on them here" (p. 236). In the process 
of using Rawls to buttress his sketch of the antinomies inherent in any 
conception of justice, Weinreb pinpoints another - possibly more in-
sightful - area of debate. Then, however, he immediately abbreviates 
any discussion of the problem of personal identity. 
This failure to pursue an emergent and innovative line of thought 
due to preoccupation with the antinomies manifests itself on a larger 
scale in the final chapter of Natural Law and Justice (pp. 224-65). 
Here, after having followed Weinreb -through the explication of three 
sets of antinomies, we expect him to derive from his explication some 
substantive, meaningful conclusions. Instead he traces the parallels be-
tween the antinomies and concludes that they are indeed irreconcilable 
- at least until a "transformation" of our understanding of our own 
experience occurs (p. 265). But the irreconcilability of the antinomies 
between freedom and causation, desert and entitlement, and liberty 
and equality are nothing new in political philosophy - or in the prac-
tice of law - and Weinreb remains mute as to what such a "transfor-
mation" of our understanding of experience could possibly mean. Nor 
does he explain why it will "be the product of accumulated facts and a 
slowly accumulating shift in the fundamental conceptual system by 
which facts are ordered" (p. 265). Although Weinreb's claim is ap-
pealing, and in line with some key contemporary social philosophy,9 
his failure to clinch his position makes it difficult to discern the point 
of Natural Law and Justice; we remain hung up on the brink of an 
interesting argument that Weinreb never develops. 
- Heidi Li Feldman 
9. See generally 1 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1981); 
Habermas, Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism, in COMMUNICATION AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 130 (1979); Taylor, Social Theory as Practice, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 91 (1985). Both Habermas and Taylor, as 
well as Rawls in his more recent work, assert a connection between theory and practice and 
develop some account of the relationship between them. 
